The BMD Dilemma: Shield or Showdown?
India faces a challenging security environment, surrounded by two nuclear-armed neighbors with whom it does not have ideal relations. In these circumstances, possessing an advanced Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system is extremely important for India. Furthermore, China's continuous development of advanced BMD capabilities makes it even more crucial for India to acquire its own ballistic missile defense capacity. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has made tremendous strides in its defense capabilities, developing a new ballistic missile defense system called the HQ-29, and is rapidly moving towards formally inducting it into its military. It is believed that China's HQ-29 BMD system is more advanced than its HQ-19 BMD system and is quite similar to the U.S. Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system. Clearly, among the multi-layered missile defense systems currently available to China, the HQ-29 BMD system is the most advanced and has a very high kill capability. This ballistic missile defense system is designed to be capable of detecting and eliminating high-end ballistic missiles, as well as intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles outside the Earth's atmosphere in mid-course. China's HQ-29 interceptor is clearly designed for defensive purposes, i.e., its main objective is to prevent satellite warfare and hypersonic attacks. China already has the HQ-19 BMD system, which has been developed and deployed to destroy medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) like India's Agni-V in mid-course. China has already deployed its HQ-19 BMD system in Jilantai, Mongolia. Now, with the development of the HQ-29 BMD system, China's defense capability will increase significantly, enabling the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to protect its critical infrastructure and the territories under its control.
Some of India's top nuclear experts believe that India needs to develop and deploy its own Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. They say that a ballistic missile defense system needs to be deployed on a priority basis to protect the country's air bases, nuclear facilities, submarine bases, and military command, control, and communication centers from enemy nuclear missile attacks. However, they also say that there is currently no specific need to deploy this system to protect cities and towns from such attacks. Clearly, deploying such a defense system to protect large cities in the country would be very costly. Broadly speaking, there are three main reasons why the need for enhanced ballistic missile defense capabilities in India is being emphasized. Especially given the way China is continuously increasing its defense capabilities and growing its power in terms of both conventional and nuclear attacks, concrete efforts should be made to bring as much of the population as possible under missile defense coverage.
Reasons for Enhancing Ballistic Missile Defense Capabilities
The first reason for India to enhance its own ballistic missile defense capabilities is India's strategy of Assured Destruction (AD) or Assured Retaliation (AR). This strategy of India is not sufficient to deter the threat of nuclear attacks, especially potential nuclear threats from China. In view of India's No First Use (NFU) policy, it is imperative for India to have an advanced ballistic missile defense system. This is because, under the NFU policy, India will retaliate only when it is attacked by a nuclear weapon by an enemy country. In other words, a missile defense system developed to prevent enemy nuclear attacks is essential. Clearly, when an enemy country launches a first nuclear strike, it could be a decapitation strike, i.e., an attack that could cause considerable military damage to India. As far as China is concerned, its own NFU policy is not at all clear. It is also noteworthy that some in-depth analyses of China's NFU policy have revealed that China does not appear as committed to its No First Use policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons in practice as it is in principle. In particular, if an enemy country attacks China's nuclear bases with conventional weapons, China will definitely not adhere to this policy. Furthermore, the likelihood of China's first use of nuclear weapons increases because of the way China is cleverly integrating its nuclear and conventional military capabilities. This strategy of China will make it impossible for an opposing country to know whether China is targeting its conventional military bases or its nuclear capabilities.
In addition, China seems to believe that it may carry out at least a limited nuclear strike in situations where it is likely to lose a conventionally fought war. Clearly, this limited nuclear attack by China could prove devastating for India. This is because India has far fewer nuclear weapons than China. India has about 180 nuclear weapons, while India's other enemy neighbor, Pakistan, has a stockpile of 170 nuclear weapons. Whereas, if we talk about China, it has a stockpile of about 600 nuclear weapons. Furthermore, China is rapidly increasing its nuclear arsenal. In other words, its pace of acquiring nuclear weapons is the fastest among any country in the world. In war situations, if a nuclear attack is launched by China in response to retaliatory ground attacks by India, it will be fatal not only for the army fighting on the ground but also equally devastating for densely populated areas located near India's air bases, nuclear facilities, and military headquarters and military control centers. If we talk about China, its ballistic missile defense systems, such as the HQ-19 and the new HQ-29 defense systems, are capable of preventing attacks by nuclear-armed missiles and act as a strong defense shield against them. This is why India's commitment to following the policy of Assured Destruction (AD) in any case is strategically and morally very dangerous. The late Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State, former National Security Advisor, and renowned nuclear strategist, expressed a different view from his fellow nuclear strategists regarding the adoption of a strategy based on Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), saying that the then-Soviet Union and the United States (US) were able to properly manage their nuclear rivalry through an agreement based on AD. Clearly, it was during Henry Kissinger's tenure that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States was signed. Despite this, he strongly opposed this type of treaty in the post-Cold War era, because the number of nations possessing nuclear power was increasing, and the possibilities and reasons for them to use nuclear weapons were also increasing significantly. In other words, the use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed nations could be done deliberately, or it could be done without authorization and suddenly. Therefore, Henry Kissinger clearly emphasized the need for ballistic missile defense capabilities to prevent any such nuclear attack.
Besides, let's say if India's nuclear power is not completely destroyed in a Chinese nuclear attack, and in particular, if the nuclear weapons launched from Indian Navy submarines survive, China's ballistic missile defense system can easily stop these remaining submarine nuclear missiles fired by India. This is why the strategy based on MAD or mutual assured destruction is not only useless and objectionable, but strategically unwise. Especially, given the way India is currently following a No First Use (NFU) policy and going through a period of strained relations with nuclear-armed neighbors like China and Pakistan, it is in no way appropriate for New Delhi to adopt such a strategy. In fact, India needs advanced deterrence capabilities like the BMD system the most, so that it can protect its large cities from attacks through air defense in adverse situations.
The second major reason for India to enhance its BMD capabilities is that China is constantly developing ballistic missile defense systems in its country. This will give China an advantage in attacking first. In addition, if China lags behind and is at a disadvantage in a conventional war against India, its developed defensive capabilities will encourage it to launch a first nuclear strike, because it will be in a position to benefit in every way. Overall, China benefits greatly from its advanced domestic BMD capabilities, giving it the power to minimize its losses in a war situation. However, India is not currently in a position to match China's missile defense system. But if India focuses on the development of its BMD systems and takes concrete steps for this, then it can definitely thwart any intention of China to launch a first nuclear strike and thus avert potential dangers.
Why Should India Enhance Its BMD Capabilities?
The third reason is the idea of the renowned American nuclear strategist Herman Kahn. He has said that missile defense research and development (R&D) is extremely important. If concrete progress is made in this direction, then along with technical benefits, it can also provide numerous opportunities that will continue to motivate defense science and engineering institutions and their scientists and engineers to find solutions to challenging technical and scientific threats. Clearly, if research and development is done in this area, then detailed information about various advanced technologies can be available, and detailed data about how they work can be collected. In other words, if attention is paid to missile defense-related research and development, as well as increasing investment in it, the reliability of interceptor systems will increase in all important stages of the missile defense system, i.e., the boost, mid-course, and terminal phases. In addition, it will help in developing new technologies for sensor technologies, radar systems, directed-energy weapons, detecting and destroying missiles outside and inside the atmosphere, as well as eliminating fragmentation warheads. Clearly, ballistic missile defense systems can be easily deployed on mobile ground launchers, sea platforms, air interceptors, and bases located in space. The most important and noteworthy thing is that if India takes missile defense research and development forward and then strategically deploys its developed BMD systems, it will help in deterring and, to some extent, gaining an edge over a rival country, especially China. It will lead to success in critical defense technologies, which will help India stay ahead of China in the technology sector. Let's say even if that doesn't happen, investing in and promoting research in the development of ballistic missile defense systems in India will at least help India stand in parity with China in terms of BMD technology. In view of all these reasons, it is extremely important that India show seriousness in enhancing its ballistic missile defense capabilities and strengthening them without wasting time, and take steps in this direction with full force."
(Author is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation's Strategic Studies Program.)