It is true that many in the Arab world view the Islamic Republic as a regional force they need to engage with. And following the Israeli bombing campaigns in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, the region’s people now see Israel as the Middle East’s most radical and destructive actor. But this does not make Iran’s vision any more realistic. It papers over Iran’s disruptive behavior across the region, including its sponsoring of violent nonstate actors and the resulting lawlessness and state failure. Iran’s scheme does recognize the right to Palestinian self-determination. But Arab countries want an end to regional anarchy, not just an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Then there is a vision put forward by the Arab Gulf states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—through the Gulf Cooperation Council. It is perhaps the most aspirational. The council’s proposals involve the Gulf countries deepening their own economic integration, establishing joint defense mechanisms, and then somehow resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a now practically impossible two-state solution. The proposal, like the Iranian one, at least acknowledges that an end to that conflict is the key to achieving regional security. But it lays out no plausible mechanism for reaching a deal. The Gulf state plan also says very little about the other conflicts in the region or how to address them.
At best, these various visions will accomplish little. At worst, they will generate even more conflict, as did the Abraham Accords. By focusing so much on security, they have turned peace into a matter of economic development and force. The Middle East’s powers seem to think that war-torn peoples will be satisfied with new construction—no need for justice, accountability, or good leadership. If people are not satisfied, they can be dealt with through violence: Israel, for example, can arrest and kill Palestinians who demand equal rights. Such assumptions are both dangerous and wrong.
CHAOS REIGNS
At the heart of the region’s troubles are questions of governance. Many countries have fractured or collapsed, with competing centers of power often dominated by particular ethnic or political groups. Nowhere is this dynamic more evident than in Syria, where years of war have weakened relations between the country’s center and its periphery and given rise to a variety of local rulers. Some places are controlled by Kurds. The places where Assad maintained the highest levels of backing were those populated by his community of Alawites. The south is controlled by the so-called Southern Operations Room, a coalition of rebel factions that emerged in 2011 and tend to be less Islamist than other groups. The organization that ultimately drove Assad from power, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is composed of Sunni former jihadists that include non-Syrian combatants. They claim that they will not discriminate against other groups. But since they took Damascus, the country has seen an uptick in revenge killings and mob violence targeting Alawites. Without an inclusive political process, Syria will remain riven by all kinds of divisions.
International involvement has hardened, and will continue to harden, such rifts. The Middle East’s main powers perpetually compete for more regional influence, so when wars occur, those powers often back different groups. In Syria, for instance, Turkey supports HTS and other factions in the north. The United States is helping the Kurds. Jordan and the United Arab Emirates have considerable sway over Syria’s Southern Operations Room. Israel is trying to bolster its ties with Syria’s Druze community and has used the power vacuum to occupy some 155 square miles of Syrian land.
For now, Syria’s factions are keeping the peace. Indeed, in a January 29 meeting, key groups involved in the overthrow of Assad came together to appoint the HTS leader Ahmad al-Shara as the country’s new president. But although Ahmed al-Awda, the leading figure in the Southern Operations Room, sent a representative to this meeting, Awda did not attend. The Kurd and Druze factions boycotted it altogether. With their shared enemy gone, Syrian militias could turn on each other. If they do, Syria’s future might look like Somalia’s present, with different factions controlling various patches of territory. Or it might look like nearby Libya. Syria and Libya are very different countries, but Libya, too, experienced an Arab Spring revolution that pitted multiple armed groups against a long time dictator. These groups succeeded in toppling Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011. But once Qaddafi was gone, they began fighting each other for dominance with the support of external actors, including Turkey, the UAE, and a number of European states. Today, rival authorities in eastern and western parts of the country are each backed by different patrons.
Reconstruction cannot fix broken institutions.
After more than ten years of civil war, Yemen, much like Libya, is politically divided between two main rival authorities: the Houthis in the north and the Presidential Leadership Council. (The Houthis control a third of the country’s area and two-thirds of the population.) Here, too, competition between outsiders has furthered conflict. Iran supports the Houthis. Saudi Arabia hosts the Presidential Leadership Council. But the Presidential Leadership Council is itself factious, and external competition leads to contention within it. The UAE, for instance, backs a group that, although part of the council, wants the southern part of Yemen to secede. Emirati-Saudi tensions over the oil-rich Yemeni province of Hadramawt have created further schisms, with Saudi Arabia generally controlling the province’s interior and the UAE dominating the coast. Proxies affiliated with both powers have clashed, and the conflict between them could turn more violent in the months ahead. This chaos has, in turn, enabled al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and other terrorist groups to expand their operations in Yemen’s east and south.
Foreign meddling in the Middle East’s conflicts is clearly bad for peace. But there is a silver lining to all the external involvement. Because the warring parties rely on international patrons, outside actors can push for resolutions. As a result, rapprochement between regional powers—such as the 2023 normalization agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia-might help tamp down conflict.
But to be effective mediators, regional actors must more thoroughly settle their own differences. The¬ escalating rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over which of them will be the Middle East’s main Arab political and economic hub is one point of tension, especially when it comes to conflicts in Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Qatar and Turkey’s support for Islamist actors is creating problems with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. And although the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement has softened sectarian divisions, it has not curtailed Iran’s support for repressive nonstate actors. As a result, it can do little to promote regional tranquility.
Even if these countries could fully sort out their rivalries, they could not ensure peace. They would still need to get local powers to implement settlements that rebuild states, ensure the safe return of displaced peoples, and mend torn social fabrics. And there is no guarantee that these actors, hardened by years of war, would comply. The issue of transitional justice, in particular, will be tricky. After fighting, some degree of forgiveness is required for societies to heal. Yet there cannot be broad amnesty, particularly for those responsible for human rights atrocities. At the end of its civil war, Lebanon opted to issue a blanket pardon for all atrocities committed during the 15-year conflict. Doing so, leaders thought, would quickly secure peace and allow the country to rebuild. They also hoped to protect themselves from prosecution. Instead, Lebanon has experienced periodic civil unrest as grievances from the war continue to fester, sometimes at the behest of the conflict’s old leaders. To avoid the same fate, Syria’s new leaders will have to hold key Assad officials accountable for the horrors committed over 54 years of autocratic rule. Failing to do so will only further encourage individual acts of vengeance—which will, in turn, make it hard to secure a durable, peaceful resolution.
NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE
In the Middle East, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to ending conflicts or rebuilding what was lost. The wars plaguing the region share many characteristics, but because they have been going on for years, they have developed their own dynamics. In Lebanon, for example, the challenge is not just rebuilding what was destroyed by the conflict with Israel. It is also about rebuilding a broken political system, trying to get Hezbollah to finally disarm, and strengthening weakened national institutions. Syria, totally ravaged by war, needs an entirely new political settlement. But Syria must not recentralize power, as it did during the Assad era. Whatever resolution emerges has to be supported across the country. It needs to account for local dynamics that materialized during the conflict.
For Gaza, the challenges are even more profound. There may be historical precedent for the scale and scope of the territory’s destruction. Yet unlike other places reduced to ruin, Gaza is not a country. It does not control its borders. It is under siege, cut off from external markets. It lacks all kinds of basic resources, including water, food, and land for agricultural or industrial production. Under such conditions, it cannot be made habitable, let alone economically viable. And there is no clear plan for who will take the lead in rebuilding and then governing it. In the near term, Gaza may need to be administered by a transitional authority established by the UN Security Council: a mechanism that was used to help rebuild parts of the Balkans and Cambodia in the 1990s, when local governance capacity was destroyed. Eventually, it will need to be governed by Palestinians who command democratic support. But right now, no short- or long-term solutions are on offer.
Without political settlements, even doling out reconstruction funds will be difficult. In fact, the provision of assistance could create tension. Domestic and regional actors often manipulate aid deliveries, creating a skewed economy that leaves some people embittered and others emboldened. Political groups could also use aid to empower themselves at the expense of governments.
None of these challenges mean that humanitarian aid groups shouldn’t flood the Middle East’s many shattered places—particularly Gaza—with support. The region has millions of people who are homeless. It has millions more who are starving or require medical care. They need whatever help they can get, and they need it fast.
There is certainly a new Middle East in the making. Yet without a political solution, reconstruction will do little over the long term. It cannot fix the power imbalances, ethnic tensions, or broken institutions that cause ongoing bloodshed. It will not get foreign powers to work together, instead of at cross-purposes. It may help people literally rebuild their homes, stores, and schools. But until there’s a durable peace, those buildings might just come crashing back down when conflict inevitably returns. 

This article, The Fatal Flaw of the New Middle East,’ was first published in  
Foreign Affairs. We are republishing it with updates, with due credit.