India and China have entered a phase of tentative rapprochement, driven by converging interests but shadowed by persistent mistrust stemming from the 2020 Galwan clash and the ensuing four years of tension along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
On 27 June 2025, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met his Chinese counterpart, Admiral Dong Jun, in Qingdao during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers’ Meeting. According to India’s Ministry of Defence, Singh emphasised the need to implement existing border agreements, particularly the disengagement framework agreed upon in October 2024. He stated that India seeks a “peaceful resolution” to border issues but warned against “any attempts to alter the status quo unilaterally,” reaffirming India’s territorial claims.
In January, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri visited Beijing and met Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong. The two sides agreed to accelerate restoration of direct air services, ease visa restrictions, and reinstitute hydrological data exchanges on transboundary rivers.
The reopening of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra in June 2025, after a four-year suspension, was viewed as a goodwill gesture. Around 40 Indian pilgrims crossed into Tibet via the Nathu La route under close logistical supervision from both sides. The pilgrimage had been suspended due to border tensions and the COVID-19 pandemic. Former Indian Ambassador to China, Ashok Kantha, told The Washington Post that while the move was symbolically significant, it should not be overinterpreted as a resolution of core disputes.
Despite renewed dialogue, fundamental sources of discord persist. The October 2024 patrolling agreement reinstated regulated patrols at contentious points like Depsang and Demchok, but several flashpoints remain unresolved. Independent defence analysts’ satellite imagery from early 2025 shows both nations constructing bunkers, helipads, and roads near the LAC. Indian military sources report that approximately 50,000 troops remain stationed in eastern Ladakh—a posture mirrored by Chinese forces.
Arunachal Pradesh continues to be a flashpoint. In March, India announced a new road project near the LAC in Tawang, prompting a strong protest from China, which claims the region as part of “South Tibet.” India reaffirmed its position, stating the region is an integral and inalienable part of the nation.
Economically, the two countries remain interdependent yet cautious. Bilateral trade stood at $118 billion in 2024, with India facing a trade deficit of over $70 billion. In response, New Delhi has tightened regulatory scrutiny on Chinese companies. Firms like Xiaomi and Vivo are under tax investigations, even as India continues to rely on Chinese imports in sectors like electronics, pharmaceuticals, and solar energy.
In early July, China rebuked Indian Minister Kiren Rijiju after he suggested that Tibetan Buddhists should oversee the Dalai Lama’s succession process. The Chinese Embassy in Delhi responded sharply, calling Tibet a sensitive issue and reiterating the One-China principle.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has yet to confirm his participation in the SCO Heads of State Summit in Tianjin this September, signalling that attendance will depend on developments along the LAC. Meanwhile, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar is expected to visit Tianjin for the SCO Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 13 July to assess the implementation of the October 2024 roadmap.
While India and China are no longer in open confrontation, reconciliation remains elusive—hindered by unresolved borders, mutual distrust, strategic rivalry, and political posturing.
Dhanishtha De is a trainee journalist at Cult Current. The views expressed in the article are
her ownand do not necessarily reflect the official stance of Cult Current.