Therecent passage of the 27th Constitutional Amendment in the Pakistani Parliament will further solidify the military’s dominance over the country’s fragile democracy. This latest modification grants unprecedented power and legal immunity to the Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir. In effect, the amendment makes it clear that the military has once again outmaneuvered the nation and its civilian leadership. The amendment weakens key democratic institutions, including not just the government but also the judiciary. It is another attempt to overturn the 1973 Constitution and shift the balance of power decisively in favor of the armed forces, severely diminishing the civilian leadership’s role while granting the already powerful military virtually unlimited authority. Crucially, the amendment ensures that Munir’s powers will remain undiminished even after any future change in government. Asim Munir is now untouchable by law, and has been officially placed above the heads of all other military branches—the Pakistani Navy and Air Force.
Seizing Power Without a Coup
Article 243 of Pakistan’s Constitution has been rewritten to create a new, supreme military post: the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF). Significantly, the current Army Chief, Asim Munir himself, will occupy this new role. According to the constitutional amendment, the establishment of this new office will effectively abolish the post of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), which was intended to foster coordination among the three services. On November 27, 2025, when the current CJCSC retires, Field Marshal Munir, as Army Chief, will also assume the role of CDF, formally subordinating all service branches to his command. This means the Army will now dominate the entire military structure in a way never before seen in Pakistan’s history. This change risks placing the Pakistani Air Force and Navy under the Chief of Army Staff, which could, however, spark dissatisfaction and increase inter-services rivalry.
If this constitutional amendment were limited only to changes in the military command chain, it would be acceptable, but it also weakens civilian oversight over the country’s nuclear arsenal. A new position, the Commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC), will be created to oversee Pakistan’s nuclear forces. The Prime Minister, on the advice of the Army Chief/CDF, will appoint a CNSC from among the Army Generals. Although theoretically the Prime Minister is involved, practically, Asim Munir and the future Army Chief will select the officer in charge of Pakistan’s nuclear forces themselves. This commander will then report to Munir through the Army’s chain of command. This could undermine the control of the National Command Authority (NCA), which was established to include civilian leaders and all service chiefs in nuclear program decisions. Under the current NCA system, strategic decisions, especially those concerning the use of nuclear weapons, require collective deliberation and are chaired by the Prime Minister. The recent amendment places the nuclear command under a General chosen by the Army, consolidating tighter control at the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi.
Munir Rises Above the Law
Furthermore, in an unprecedented move, top military officers have been granted extensive personal privileges, essentially making them unaccountable in a ‘democratic’ country. They are now above the law and cannot be prosecuted in any court. The amendment provides lifelong constitutional protection to any officer who reaches the five-star rank. The five-star ranks include Field Marshal (Army), Marshal of the Air Force (Air Force), or Admiral of the Fleet (Navy). These ranks have been rarely used in Pakistan, but Asim Munir was hastily promoted to the rank of Field Marshal following a military conflict with India in May 2025. The latest amendment to Article 243 is a step taken to secure Munir’s promotion in the Constitution and ensure his status for life. Under the new amendment’s provisions, a five-star rank officer will ‘hold the post, privileges, and uniform for life.’ He can only be tried under impeachment proceedings. Simply put, legally, Asim Munir will be acquitted and beyond the reach of the courts. This is because no court or future civilian government can charge a five-star rank officer with a crime or remove him from office without a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Similarly, the Navy and Air Force Chiefs have also been given a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for their role in Operation Banyan Al Marsous in May 2025, like Field Marshal Munir. They too will wear the Khaki uniform for life as four-star Generals and will also enjoy immunity from any legal action.
Judicial Independence Undermined
Another alarming aspect of this constitutional amendment is that it further weakens the independence of the judiciary in Pakistan. The efforts to undermine the autonomy of the courts, which began at the start of the Shehbaz Sharif government’s term, continue unabated. The amendment establishes a new Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) to handle constitutional matters, thereby diminishing the Supreme Court’s role as the ultimate legal authority of the Constitution. The Chief Justice of the Pakistani Supreme Court will be junior in status to the Chief Justice of the new FCC. The Chief Justice of the FCC can hold office until the age of 68, while the retirement age for a Pakistani Supreme Court Justice is 65. The gradual erosion of judicial independence has been a notable achievement for Asim Munir and the coalition government led by Shehbaz Sharif in Islamabad. However, this achievement is likely to be considered a major failure for democracy in the future.
The process of reducing the authority of courts in Pakistan began in 2024 when Parliament passed the controversial 26th Amendment. This amendment changed the process of judicial appointments and eliminated the Supreme Court’s power to take suo motu cognizance of any case. There was a time when the courts played the biggest role in removing General Musharraf from power in 2008, but the proposed changes will make Pakistan’s judiciary completely politicized and under the control of the executive. Indirectly, the judiciary will now be under the control of the military establishment. Pakistan’s Supreme Court is now a weak shadow of its formerly powerful self. Pakistan’s good fortune, for now, is that Munir and Shehbaz Sharif have decided to keep Chief Justice Yahya Afridi in his position as Chief Justice of Pakistan until his scheduled term. After that, the position of Chief Justice of Pakistan will be held by the Justice who is senior among the Federal Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
Bilawal Forgets the ‘Sacrifices’ of his Grandfather and Mother
The most tragic part is that Pakistan’s political leadership has bowed by agreeing to these constitutional amendments that strengthen the military and Asim Munir. This is a clear indication of how weak and powerless Pakistan’s democratic institutions have become over the last three years. The Shehbaz government introduced the amendment in the Senate amidst near-silence from major political parties. The amendment passed with a two-thirds majority in the Senate after symbolic protests and minor disruptions. The Muslim League (Nawaz) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) were the orchestrators of this amendment as part of the ruling coalition. Surprisingly, the Pakistan People’s Party has historically been a critic of military dominance at various times. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his daughter Benazir Bhutto paid the price for this opposition with their lives. Today, the same Pakistan People’s Party is justifying this constitutional amendment, which strengthens the military, through technical arguments and nationalist rhetoric. It appears that PPP leader Bilawal Bhutto is more focused on maintaining Munir’s favor than considering the long-term damage this amendment will cause to Pakistan. Pakistan’s ‘hybrid’ system has now deteriorated to the extent that civilian government interference is barely noticeable.
Asim Munir’s apparent lust for power can be compared to military dictators like General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s and General Pervez Musharraf in the early 2000s. There are several clear similarities among the three. Both Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf bypassed Parliament and the courts, issued their own decrees, and then resorted to constitutional amendments to institutionalize their dominance. The Eighth Amendment was passed during Zia’s rule, while the Seventeenth Amendment was executed during Musharraf’s time. Like Munir, they concentrated power in their hands for many years. Despite these similarities, there are some major differences in Munir’s approach. Unlike his predecessors, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf, Munir has neither imposed complete martial law nor has he formally assumed any civilian office like the presidency. Instead, Munir is operating from behind the scenes, controlling power according to his will, and allowing the civilian-led system to function for show.
Munir Gains Power at Home, Respect Abroad
Munir has taken advantage of a compliant government to pass laws that strengthen the military. This provides him with two direct benefits. The first is that Munir avoids the international stigma associated with a coup, and the second is that he is easily achieving his goals without facing the fatigue of day-to-day governance. For appearances, at least, Munir is operating under a nominal constitutional framework, although he is changing policies according to his will whenever he chooses. Most importantly, Munir has created a status for himself that will benefit him in many ways in the future. Following the recent constitutional amendment to the Field Marshal rank, the law can no longer touch him. Neither Zia-ul-Haq nor Musharraf received such a status, at least not with such explicit privileges. Over the past three years, Munir has employed every tactic—persuasion, temptation, punishment, and manipulation—to consolidate his power. Where necessary, he has acted cleverly. On many occasions, he has worked on behalf of the government. The military played a significant role in neutralizing the political opposition led by Imran Khan’s party, PTI. In return, the government has gifted Munir with curtailed judicial independence and a legislature that is essentially subordinate to the military. Munir has been guaranteed his term and his legacy. This is a military establishment coup achieved without deploying tanks on the streets of Islamabad or activating the notorious 111th Infantry Brigade.
Over the past three years, the democratic decline in Pakistan has reached an unprecedented level. The passage of controversial constitutional amendments, the weakening of the judiciary, widespread human rights violations, rigging of national elections, and the excessive use of force against citizens and the political opposition have severely weakened democracy in Pakistan. Yet, interestingly, the international reaction to the demise of democracy in Pakistan has been indifferent. Western countries, who are usually vocal in support of democratic norms, have limited their response to mild diplomatic whispers in Pakistan’s case. Surprisingly, the acceptance of the military, which is undermining democracy in Pakistan, is growing in Western capitals, especially with support coming from Washington for the Pakistani military and Asim Munir. U.S. President Donald Trump openly praised Munir, calling him his ‘favorite Field Marshal,’ and officially welcomed him to the White House. However, it is a reality that the U.S. has always encouraged military rule in Pakistan, largely because it finds it easier to deal with military rulers, who are more pliable to U.S. policy demands. This U.S. acceptance has further strengthened Munir’s confidence. It is believed that with the U.S. backing, Munir will take bold domestic steps and adopt a more aggressive stance towards neighbors, especially India and Afghanistan.
This constitutional amendment that strengthens Munir is a severe blow to Pakistan’s democratic credentials. Munir’s influence remains immense because he still wears the epaulets—the strips on the military uniform showing rank stars. The judiciary, which was once a symbol of resistance in Pakistan, has also been silenced through changes in laws. The Pakistani Supreme Court’s power to act as the final interpreter of the Constitution in cases of violation of the basic structure of the Constitution has also been weakened. It is important to note that the Parliament does not have the absolute authority to amend the Constitution. The Parliament has compromised its integrity under military pressure, making a mockery of parliamentary authority, while mainstream political parties have demonstrated immaturity by either giving tacit consent or allowing themselves to become powerless. The establishment has undermined the foundations of democracy to control and protect its privileged status. It has used the symbiotic patron-client relationship between the political and military elite through pressure and incentives.
Why Do Politicians Surrender to the Army in Pakistan?
Although the surrender of civilian institutions to the military in Pakistan is not surprising, the over-centralization of power in one person and one institution pushes the country towards long-term instability. Historically, Pakistan has ample evidence that when institutional balance is disrupted, a reaction eventually flares up in some form, whether from within the military, on the streets, or through unexpected crises. However, in an environment lacking transparency and inclusiveness, Munir’s dominance currently faces no visible challenge
Overall, while the common people of Pakistan are witnessing the curtailment of their democratic rights under the guise of the Constitution-clothed martial law, the Pakistan Muslim League has compromised with the military to ensure the continuity of its governments led by Maryam Nawaz in Lahore and Shehbaz Sharif in Islamabad. The Pakistan People’s Party has also secured immunity for Asif Ali Zardari, who is entangled in countless corruption cases. Although Imran Khan remains a popular figure in Pakistani politics, he and the PTI still have few concessions. Munir’s rise to power is not a new development, but according to analysts, the goodwill and support Munir received from the public after Operation Banyan Al Marsus has diminished. A large section of the Pakistani public is unhappy with Asim Munir, especially Imran Khan’s supporters, who believe their leader was jailed at the behest of the military.
From an Indian perspective, the strengthening of the military establishment in Pakistani politics, foreign policy, and strategic interests will only be detrimental. Relations between the two countries have remained strained since the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025. The military’s firm grip on power will increase tensions. Along with the warming relations between Washington and Rawalpindi, the Pakistani military’s nationalistic fervor is at its peak. Furthermore, India will maintain its tough stance towards Pakistan. India does not want any kind of relationship with the military regime of Pakistan. The recent terrorist attack on the Red Fort in Delhi on November 12, 2025, has further deepened the mistrust in relations. This attack was carried out by Kashmiri radical elements, and India believes Pakistan had a hand in it. Following this attack, the already tense India-Pakistan relations have become even more volatile, with no scope for improvement.
Rajiv Sinha is a former Special Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat and a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He is an expert on India’s neighboring countries and security issues. Saral Sharma previously worked at the NSCS and is currently pursuing a PhD in Security Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi. We are republishing this article with gratitude to the Observer Research Foundation.