At the ongoing COP30, where decision-makers negotiate how much money should flow from where to keep global warming under control, India has called on developed nations to “deliver on promises.” India's minister for environment, forest and climate change, Bhupender Yadav, delivered a statement at Belem, Brazil this week asserting that “developed countries must reach net zero far earlier than current target dates and deliver new, additional, and concessional climate finance at a scale of trillions, not billions.” He further stressed the need for affordable, accessible climate technology and stated that climate technology must be free from restrictive intellectual property barriers. Speaking at another event, Yadav also highlighted achievements in renewable energy, saying that India has crossed 500 gigawatts of installed electricity capacity – and more than half of it is clean energy.
But the global conversation on climate transition is expanding beyond emissions and finance. Attention is shifting to a less-visible but decisive factor: the minerals powering the clean-energy revolution. For India, still heavily dependent on imports of lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare-earth elements, this marks a strategic turning point.
In 2025, New Delhi launched the National Critical Mineral Mission to secure long-term supplies, boost domestic processing, and create value-chain linkages with like-minded economies. The logic is simple: without access to the building blocks of batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, and hydrogen electrolyzers, India’s low-carbon ambitions risk supply insecurity. The stakes are large. A World Trade Organization analysis shows trade in energy-related critical minerals surged from $53 billion in 2000 to $378 billion in 2022.
At the same time, India is 100% import-dependent for at least ten essential minerals, including lithium and cobalt.
In that context, this COP30 offered India a diplomatic opening to link domestic industrialization with multilateral governance of mineral supply chains, moving from a buyer to a co-architect of global rules.
Domestically, India is scaling its exploration footprint. The Geological Survey of India increased critical-mineral exploration projects from 118 in 2021-22 to 196 in 2024-25 (fiscal). Internationally, India has begun building partnerships beyond its traditional suppliers, engaging with Brazil, Argentina, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Australia for access to lithium, cobalt, and rare earths.
One emblematic example is the Altmin-Brazil project, which will refine spodumene ore into 32,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate annually and became the first Indian project listed under the Minerals Security Partnership. Such ventures represent a shift from commodity procurement to shared industrial capacity. India’s limited reserves of key lithium-ion battery minerals, as much as 12-60% of the value chain currently depends on imports, underscoring the urgency to build local processing, note analysts at the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW).
At the policy level, India’s national mineral mission aims to fast-track 1,200 exploration projects, attract private investment for processing facilities, and create mineral-processing parks linked to the government’s Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes for green manufacturing. Together, these initiatives lay the foundation for India’s role as a strategic partner in an emerging global mineral order, one that emphasizes shared value creation and industrial resilience.
Mineral Diplomacy
The mineral dimension of climate policy is fast becoming a test of economic competitiveness and regulatory foresight. As the clean-energy transition accelerates, nations are racing to secure lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare-earth supplies that underpin battery storage, electric mobility, and renewable integration. Analysts warn that these minerals could become the new oil, not for their price volatility, but for their potential to re-create geopolitical asymmetries if governance fails to evolve.
For India, this surge in demand is both a warning and a window of opportunity: a chance to establish frameworks before they ossify under others’ influence.
Its strategic leverage lies in combining market size, industrial ambition, and diplomatic engagement to shape emerging norms around equitable mineral access, environmental safeguards, and value-chain transparency, all critical to ensuring that the next energy order is built on sustainability, not substitution.
Geoeconomically, India’s position combines scale and timing. With energy demand projected to grow nearly 3% annually to 2030, and a goal of 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by that year, securing mineral inputs is essential. Meanwhile, China still dominates the mid-stream: over 90% of global rare-earth magnet processing occurs there. India’s strategy to diversify through Brazil, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific is therefore an act of long-term de-risking.
India’s projected annual requirement of critical minerals such as cobalt, nickel, lithium, neodymium underscores why India’s mineral diplomacy can no longer be incremental. Between 2025 and 2030, domestic demand for lithium and cobalt alone is set to rise more than two hundredfold, while nickel use will nearly sixfold. These trajectories mirror India’s accelerating electrification, but also its deepening import exposure. The trend transforms minerals into what oil once was, a strategic currency of power. If unaddressed, it could replace hydrocarbon dependence with mineral vulnerability.
From Policy Participant to Rule-Shaper
If India is to turn its mineral ambitions into lasting strategic autonomy, a few refinements could sharpen its framework further. Comparing India’s approach with other Global-South leaders offers perspective. Brazil is moving from raw exports to local value-addition; its industry blueprint for a National Policy for Critical and Strategic Minerals places emphasis on domestic processing and governance, while new partnerships and financing aim to build rare-earths capacity. South Africa’s community-inclusive model links mining rights to local welfare via mandatory social and labor plans.
Yet structural constraints remain. India’s domestic refining base is limited, and technology partnerships for beneficiation, separation and recycling must be accelerated. The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis urges India to expand joint research and secure technology licenses to avoid mid-stream dependency. Governance frameworks also need to evolve.
The forthcoming National Mineral Policy 2025 should institutionalize environmental and social standards across new projects, ensuring the drive for autonomy does not come at ecological cost. Finally, advancing a Global Minerals Equity at COP30, echoing civil-society calls to embed transparency, equity, environmental safeguards, and labor rights into mineral governance would elevate India from policy participant to rule-shaper in the emerging mineral order.
Hence, India’s engagement at COP30 is not about resource acquisition but about reshaping value chains: securing technology partnerships, investing in refining, and co-designing global mineral governance. The steepness of the curve itself justifies India’s shift, from a passive importer to an active architect of the next energy order.
Manish Vaid is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, with his research interests primarily encompassing strategic energy studies and green energy transitions. This article of his, originally published in RT, is being reproduced here with due acknowledgment.