The roots of Iran's current water crisis are deeply embedded in its political journey. During the Pahlavi regime, the country placed its entire emphasis on industrialization and modernization. Through the White Revolution (1963), the Shah sought to transform Iran into a modern, industrial state capable of strongly competing with Western economies. At the time, agriculture was not merely neglected but was intentionally deprioritized. This was a calculated decision where capital, labor, and infrastructure were directed toward factories, oil, and heavy industry.
Land reforms fragmented large estates into small holdings, severing the traditional landlord-peasant relationship. While aiming for equality, these reforms disrupted agricultural practices and alienated the rural elite. Due to the lack of capital and irrigation infrastructure, many small farmers viewed the Shah's modernization as an assault on Iran's traditional agricultural system.
This resentment proved crucial for political rebellion. These dissatisfied villagers and small-town residents formed the initial base of support for the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Religious leaders, including Ayatollah Khomeini, who came from a modest rural background, capitalized on this discontent. Following the revolution, a major policy shift occurred: agriculture was no longer just an economic sector but became an ideological symbol of national truth and revolutionary justice.
The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) further solidified this change. Wartime self-sufficiency promoted the concept of Khodkafa'i (self-sufficiency). Food grain production became a symbol of resilience against foreign dependence. The government decided to massively expand agriculture. Dams were constructed, and water-intensive crops like wheat, rice, and sugarcane were subsidized, even in drought-prone areas.
In the Shia tradition, the denial of water to Imam Hussein, his family, and supporters during the Battle of Karbala is a powerful moral symbol. After the revolution, this symbol took the shape of a welfare policy, and the state declared that no one would be denied access to water. Barriers to supplying water to homes were lowered, ensuring that water was not a commodity but a human right. However, this religious commitment encouraged excessive water use and fostered public indifference toward conservation, creating conditions for long-term water scarcity.
Cultural and Ideological Dimensions
In Iran, water is not merely a natural resource but an ideological construct tied to the identity of the revolution. The Islamic Republic views the provision of water and bread to all as divine justice and governmental compassion. Consequently, agricultural subsidies, especially in villages, became a tool for political inclusion and loyalty. Farmers, long considered the 'guardians of the revolution,' began to benefit excessively from cheap electricity and irrigation water.
This is more than just a means of appeasement; it reflects the government's deep-seated roots in the villages. The early leadership viewed farming as a sacred duty and a revolutionary obligation. They saw self-sufficiency as a moral virtue, prioritizing social equity over industrial efficiency and loyalty over competence.
Thus, bread has become an ideological issue. This is evident in countless Persian proverbs centered on bread as the foundation of dignity, livelihood, and divine blessing. Therefore, suggesting that bread or the water used to produce it should be treated as a valuable commodity is politically suicidal. This is why proposals for water price reforms are usually dismissed as 'anti-Islamic' or 'elitist.'
The symbolic significance of bread in Persian and Islamic culture has reinforced this commitment. Ensuring that 'bread is always on the table' and 'does not come from another country' has become both a social contract and a religious duty.
This mindset has also led to policy paralysis. Decision-makers, many of whom emerged from revolutionary and wartime institutions rather than the bureaucracy, view the water crisis through a wartime lens—where endurance, not conservation, is required. Water scarcity is considered another source of tension requiring citizens to show patience. Such thinking undermines the reform process. As a result, subsidies persist, consumption continues, and the narrative that once unified the nation is now obstructing the strategic planning necessary for stability.
Current Challenges
All of this has a negative impact. Iran's water crisis is now affecting structural, administrative, and social aspects.
Structural and Industrial Conflicts
Early post-revolutionary governments spent heavily on dams and canals, but 'water mafias' constructed dams that were rarely fully filled. This led to a drop in groundwater levels in plains since the 1990s, turning once-fertile lands into dust. More seriously, the state is both a regulator and a competitor. Many of Iran's water-intensive industries, including steel, petrochemicals, and the energy sector, are entirely state-owned or controlled by semi-military establishments. Thus, the government benefits from the very deficiencies it is supposed to fix. Any reform curbing industrial water use would also threaten state revenue.
Corruption and Illegal Water Extraction
Large-scale illegal well-digging has exacerbated the water shortage. Thousands of unauthorized wells are extracting water without control, often with political patronage. Corruption and weak law enforcement mean that even existing laws are applied arbitrarily. Officials have little incentive to impose fines and often profit from this nexus.
Technical Deficiencies and Policy Inertia
After the Iran-Iraq War, many former soldiers joined the civil service. They were deemed loyal due to their revolutionary background but lacked a technical perspective. Water policy is determined not by hydrologists or economists, but by military and like-minded figures. Consequently, solutions to the water crisis are sought in a wartime context—reactive, short-term, and focused on resistance rather than reform.
Emergency Governance
Iran's broad political culture reinforces this complacency, as the government constantly grapples with emergency situations—sanctions, inflation, energy shortages, and social unrest. This prevents water crisis management from being prioritized. There is also a lack of consensus on investment strategy, with highly visible, quickly completed projects like dam construction being favored over long-term catchment area management.
Social and Security Impact
Rural areas, once the core of the revolution, are now centers of discontent. Farmers have repeatedly protested the drying up of rivers like the Zayanderud in Isfahan, demanding government accountability. In Khuzestan, similar protests turned violent due to destructive dam construction and river diversion for industrial use, which ruined agriculture. The drought is accelerating rural-to-urban migration, increasing unemployment, housing shortages, and public dissatisfaction.
The Way Forward
Iran possesses the scientific capacity to make its water resources more sustainable, but its political and ideological framework obstructs reform.
Diversification and Importation
Iran can reduce pressure on its water resources by importing water-intensive crops like rice and sugarcane and focusing on drought-resistant varieties. However, this contradicts the principle of self-sufficiency, which is integral to the revolution's identity. Politicians fear that promoting imports would be a symbolic betrayal of the revolutionary promise. Beyond crop diversification, Iran could modernize its irrigation systems by replacing flood irrigation with efficient drip irrigation Shutterstock, maximizing water use in agriculture. Small-scale groundwater recharge projects and soil moisture monitoring systems, if implemented alongside, could help sustain rural livelihoods without the heavy expense of new dams.
Subsidy and Governance Reform
Better pricing mechanisms could curb water wastage, but removing subsidies risks alienating the government's most loyal base: rural farmers. The experience of 2019, when rising fuel prices triggered nationwide unrest, serves as a stark warning. The real problem is the state's own massive water consumption; for any rule to be effective, it would first have to restrict its own industries, which it has consistently resisted. Alongside pricing reform, investment in urban wastewater recycling and industrial water reuse is essential to reduce fresh water consumption. Desalination can create strategic reserves for coastal cities like Bandar Abbas and Bushehr, easing pressure on local water resources.
Technical Empowerment
Bringing in technically trained administrators instead of military and religious figures to decision-making roles would ensure a more sustainable approach to water management. However, such a change requires a shift in power that the Islamic Republic is unlikely to support. As long as critical decisions are determined by an 'adversarial mindset,' policy processes will prioritize short-term control and suppression of protests over advancing major structural reforms.
Kamyar Kayvanfar is a communication and public relations expert fluent in original Persian and English. This article was originally published in the Middle East edition of ORF, and we are republishing it with gratitude.