How courts and EC enable disenfranchisement- .
The ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls is proving to be a textbook example of how the Indian state keeps destabilising citizens' lives, writes Suhas Palshikar.
Earlier this week, this newspaper reported that tribunals in West Bengal are struggling to tackle cases arising out of the SIR. "No full stops in Bengal SIR. Those 'excluded' now in dark about what next," August 17. There are also reports of growing numbers of "absent," "shifted," "dead" and "duplicate" citizens from state where exercise is going on. While ECI may face brunt of criticism and media attention on this count, it is important to remember that Supreme Court has produced this impasse.
The Court's ruling in the SIR case in May 2026 is a reminder that judiciary can, at times, become enabler of state practices that harm citizens. ADR & Others vs ECI & Others offers troubling roadmap for such outcome. A refusal to position judiciary as effective arbiter between power of state and rights of citizens.
As we mourn consequences for those affected by SIR, we should not lose sight of significance of ruling itself. It may have far-reaching consequences, but not because it strengthened citizens' rights, but because it demonstrated how judiciary can enable state at expense of citizen.
The ruling not only upholds ECI's power to conduct SIR; it also records Court's satisfaction with procedure adopted by Commission, stating that deletions are within parameters of that procedure. In effect, judgment places considerable trust in poll body.
A magnanimous reading of verdict could be that Court was confronted with two competing approaches. One would have been to adopt posture of healthy suspicion on behalf of citizens — a scepticism towards claims of authority by ECI, coupled with recognition that judicial vigilance is necessary to maintain balance between state's asserted powers and reasonable fears about protection of citizens' rights. Alternative was to repose trust in another constitutional authority, such as ECI, on assumption that constitutional institutions are themselves sufficiently committed to protecting citizens' rights, making intensive judicial scrutiny unnecessary. The Court chose latter approach.
In doing so, overlooked crucial possibility: An authority may undermine citizens' rights not through any explicit intention to do so, but through unreasonable practices. This is where error in SIR ruling resonates with broader contemporary judicial tendency — one that increasingly privileges "authority" vis-a-vis citizens.
Other error lies in Court's failure to anchor judgement in foundational principle underlying controversy — representation. The logic of representation does not appear to have sufficiently informed Court's interpretation of ECI's authority. As democracy has evolved and idea of citizenship has expanded, full inclusion has emerged as one of central requirements. This not only means that citizenship should not be denied or diminished on grounds such as sex, religion, race, caste or class, but also that political representation is not meaningful if citizens are effectively disabled from participating in elections as voters.
Participating in elections, conduct of elections inevitably produces flawed representation. Having accepted that ECI has power to prepare electoral rolls, and therefore, to examine whether a person is genuinely entitled to be included on them, Court has failed to ensure that Commission's power of scrutiny does not result in exclusion or harassment of eligible voters.
It is unfortunate that ECI does not appear to have been seized of question of inclusion, Court's failure to sufficiently engage with it is also troubling.
As general rule, state's axe of exclusion operates randomly. However, both in abstract and as empirical reality, who are most likely to be adversely affected by insistence on documentation regime as evidence of citizenship? It has been repeatedly pointed out that certain social sections — vast numbers of women, poor and marginalised — are particularly vulnerable to being trapped by such regimes. The SIR, therefore, risks becoming a hatchet rather than purifying procedure. Court has neither engaged with conceptual question of exclusion nor adequately considered empirical possibility that SIR may disproportionately affect vulnerable citizens and, in doing so, undermine democratic representation.
This approach leaves citizens vulnerable to consequences beyond loss of their voting rights. SIR verdict actually directs the ECI to report to Home Ministry names of persons whose names have been deleted, for further adjudication of their claims. Thus, judgment not only permits exclusion from democratic representation; it also allows ECI and government to potentially weaponise SIR exercise, pushing individuals into zone of doubt, suspicion and harassment. It is striking that judgment so cautious about judiciary entering ECI's domain has, obliquely, enabled Commission to transcend its own domain and become enmeshed with executive authority.As SIR leaves growing number of voters in limbo, one cannot but rue judiciary's role, one cannot but rue. When exercise is complete, it may have created multitude of SADs — Shifted, Absent, Duplicate — who are then pushed to margins of formal existence, as their passports or claims to various welfare schemes may also be cast into doubt. From SIR to SAD is slippery slope that judiciary has facilitated, perhaps unintentionally.