On June 9, a Supreme Court Division Bench observed that the court cannot remain a mute spectator in matters concerning animals, noting that their wellbeing is of paramount importance. The case was Jayakrishna Menon vs Krishnankutty & Ors - an ownership dispute over Raman, Kerala's tallest elephant used for temple activities.
Raman's temporary custodian was responsible for care and upkeep but the elephant continued to be used for temple activities despite it being prohibited by the top court. SC ordered Kerala government to take custody of Raman, emphasising that it would fail in its duty towards "voiceless animals" if it turned a blind eye to defiance.
On the other end, in Re: City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, 2026, a three-judge Bench adopted a much narrower interpretation of law which led to removal of large numbers of dogs from public institutions.
The judiciary's differential treatment of two categories - elephants and street dogs - raises moral and legal questions, argue Apoorva, Shubham Dhamelia and Shreeja S., researchers at Animal Law & Policy Network Foundation.
Why is one elephant's wellbeing of "paramount importance", while welfare of lakhs of street dogs is disregarded? How can the same institution adopt two contrasting, if not contradictory, approaches to decide issues involving similar moral considerations? And is the judiciary the best positioned institution to decide cases that seal fate of animals, for better or for worse?
They acknowledge these two cases and the animals at centre are not identical. Legal protections these two animals are entitled to, and their interactions with humans vary significantly. The Indian elephant is a charismatic animal, listed as an Endangered Species on IUCN Red List, and is explicitly protected under Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The street dog, on the other hand, is legally perceived as a problem that needs to be tackled. One is expected to live in the wild away from human habitation while the other shares public spaces, requiring us to learn to coexist.
While it is important to recognise these differences, it is also crucial to question whether they are significant enough to attract completely different moral and legal considerations.
As moral philosopher Peter Singer has argued, basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration. For Singer, equal consideration is extended to every being that has interests, has some subjective awareness, or is capable of feeling pleasure or pain. Singer accepts that equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights. However, when comparing the two judgments in question, it is the absence of equal consideration itself that seems to be leading to differential treatment.
There is also anthropocentric bias. Wildlife Protection Act for elephants, and Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 that apply to street dogs reveal an anthropocentric bias in evaluating worth of animals, which in turn determines nature and level of protections they are entitled to.
Two different cases involving different animals presented contrasting approaches to treatment of animals by SC. This highlights a gap in legislative guidance for ensuring well-being of animals, different as they may be in their categorisation in eyes of law. The Swiss Constitution, for example, not only ensures well-being of animals but also ensures protection of animal dignity which grants animals an inherent worth. This responsibility ultimately lies with Parliament which should extend protection to every being worthy of moral consideration. We need a strong legislative foundation which provides moral consideration to all animals and enables pathways for ethical coexistence.