Revitalizing the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

The Indo-Japanese bilateral relationship is pivotal in upholding the free and open rules-based order in the broader international relations milieu today. In the past two decades, successive national governments of the two countries have undertaken steps to deepen strategic cooperation across all domains. In the face of global fragmentation, polarisation, and inward-looking global powers, the partners remain invested in maintaining and strengthening the free, open, and inclusive rules-based global order.

The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) was established in 2017 by the Indian and Japanese governments to further democratic, sustainable, and inclusive development in Africa, which is increasingly emerging as a theatre of great-power contestation in a fragmented global order. The corridor starts from the Yokohama and Tokyo ports in Japan and Mumbai in India, connecting the bilateral partners to Africa’s east coast in Tanzania. The AAGC’s foundations consist of four pillars: capacity and skills enhancement; quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity; development and cooperation projects; and people-to-people partnerships. However, due to domestic political upheavals and changing foreign policy priorities in both India and Japan, the corridor is yet to be materialised.

The corridor starts from the Yokohama and Tokyo ports in Japan and Mumbai in India, connecting the bilateral partners to Africa’s east coast in Tanzania.

This article explores the nuances of the AAGC and argues that it is a strategic priority for India and Japan. Additionally, this piece offers recommendations for revamping the AAGC.

An Indo-Japanese strategic priority

Africa’s heft in the global order is increasing. This is substantiated by the growing interest of great powers in the continent. There is an economic and connectivity corridor in every corner of the continent, from the United States (US) Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), Europe’s Global Gateway and its 12 strategic corridors, Italy’s Mattei Plan, to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Of these, China’s BRI has generated the most geopolitical and economic heft for the investor, Beijing. Under the BRI framework, China has remained the continent’s largest creditor and development partner for most of the last 15 years. BRI economic engagement in Africa amounted to US$200 billion between 2013 and 2024. Russia, too, has been expanding its military cooperation in the continent, having signed agreements on defence collaboration and equipment purchases with 43 countries in Africa so far. Moscow is also the largest supplier of defence equipment to the continent. Thus, the ‘No Limits’ partners China and Russia seem to have monopolised Africa’s economic and security partnership domains.

The AAGC is a strategic priority for India and Japan because China’s economic heft stands to challenge India’s leadership in the Global South, its development partnerships and geopolitical heft in Africa established through postcolonial bonhomie, and decades of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. For Japan, maintaining a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), upholding the rules-based global order in multilateral organisations, and cooperating with the resource-rich continent is critical to meet current and future national aspirations.

China’s strategy for the African bloc at the UN has been to build alliances based on economic development while engaging in multi-pronged efforts to mute criticism of its human-rights record.

Chinese and Russian influence in the continent is also reflected in their voting patterns at the United Nations (UN). Less than half of the African bloc voted in favour of serious multilateral action against Russia in the UN General Assembly. China’s strategy for the African bloc at the UN has been to build alliances based on economic development while engaging in multi-pronged efforts to mute criticism of its human-rights record. The increasing Chinese influence in the UN is detrimental to India, which is consistently aspiring to assume a greater role in global governance. Similarly, increasing Russian influence is directly detrimental to the Japanese foreign policy goal of a FOIP.